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In Defense of Administrative Agency
Autonomy
A. Michael Froomldn
Recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that Congress lacks the consti-
tutional authority to insulate any federal agency or high-ranking civil of-
ficer from complete presidential control,' and that so-called independent 2
1. The power to hire, and especially to fire, is the essence of control in federal administration. See
Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3189-91 (1986) (General Accounting Office held to be in legisla-
tive branch in large part because Congress can remove top officer by joint resolution). When Congress
chooses to insulate an agency from presidential control, it frequently does so by protecting its top
officer(s) from presidential removal. See, e.g., Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958)
(unanimous decision) (congressional purpose in creating independent commission was to protect com-
missioners from "Damocles' sword of removal").
Congress has always chosen to place most executive functions directly under the President's control.
Today the large majority of federal administrators work for agencies whose senior official, typically a
Cabinet member, serves at the pleasure of the President. The regulatory and social welfare functions
that dominate the domestic aspect of the federal administrative state are almost entirely the result of
direct delegation to the President or his subordinates, often through the device of broad and long-lived
statutes by which Congress delegates authority for an indefinite period, e.g. over budget-making. See
Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legislative Veto,
1983 Sup. CT. REv. 125, 169-70 (examples).
Nevertheless, Congress has sought to limit or eliminate the President's removal power in several
areas. The President may remove the seven members of the Federal Reserve Board for "cause." 12
U.S.C. § 242 (1982). The heads of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1982), the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 29 U.S.C.A. § 661(b) (West 1985), the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, 30 U.S.C. § 823(b)(1) (1982), the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 42 U.S.C. § 7171(b) (1982), the Interstate Commerce Commission, 49
U.S.C.A. § 10301(c) (West 1986), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5841(e)
(West 1983), may be removed by the President for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office" but presumably for no other cause.
More restrictive statutes protect the heads of other "independent" agencies. Commissioners of the
Consumer Product Safety Commission "may be removed by the President for neglect of duty or mal-
feasance in office but for no other cause." 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) (1982). A similar standard applies to
the Commission on Civil Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1975(d) (Supp. III 1985). Board members of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) are entitled to "notice and hearing" if the President should
seek to remove them for either of the two permitted causes, neglect or malfeasance. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a)
(1982).
There is no statutory provision for the removal of the heads of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, see 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d (West Supp. 1986), nor for the Federal Election Commission, see 2
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federal agencies may therefore be unconstitutional.' The Justice Depart-
ment" and many legal scholars5 concur. If the courts adopt this view, Con-
U.S.C. § 437c (1982), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, see 7 U.S.C. § 4a(a) (1982), the
Energy Research and Development Agency, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 5812(a) (West 1983), nor the Federal
Communications Commission, see 47 U.S.C.A. § 154 (West 1962 & Supp. 1986); see also Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 262 n.30 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing statutes enacted between
1861 and 1926 that lack removal clauses).
2. Independent agencies are federal implementing, regulatory, and/or adjudicative bodies outside
both the legislature and the judiciary, the top officials of which serve for a fixed term during which
they are not subject to official direction by the President and may be removed, if at all, only for cause.
See supra note I (statutes governing removal of heads of independent agencies).
It is difficult to compile a definitive list of independent agencies, or at times to determine in which
branch of government, if any, they belong. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105 (1982) ("independent
establishment" defined as not in executive department, military, Government corporation, or in inde-
pendent establishment; "Executive agency" defined as "an Executive department, a Government cor-
poration, [or] an independent establishment"); 31 U.S.C. § 102 (1982) ("executive agency" means "a
department, agency or instrumentality in the executive branch of the United States Government").
44 U.S.C.A. § 3502(10) (West Supp. 1986) defines 16 named bodies "and any other similar agency
designated by statute as a Federal independent regulatory agency or commission" as "independent
regulatory agenclies]." The list is certainly not exhaustive. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1975(d) (Supp. III
1985) (Commission on Civil Rights members removable by President only for "neglect of duty or
malfeasance in office"). Moreover, independent agencies need not necessarily be "regulatory." For
example, the Energy Research and Development Administration is "an independent executive
agency," according to 42 U.S.C. § 5811 (1982). See also, 12 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West Supp. 1986)
(Farm Credit Administration "shall be an independent agency in the executive"). One authority
counts 63 independent agencies. I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.8 (2d ed. 1978).
As a matter of practice, the heads of independent agencies are almost uniformly Officers of the
United States, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, cl. 2. But Congress can create agencies headed by an "inferior Officer," appointed by the
President or by another executive official. Id. It is settled law that Congress may forbid the President
from removing such an inferior officer. United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886). In theory, the
President could be cut out of the appointment process altogether; Congress can vest the power to
appoint inferior federal officials in federal judges. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Ex parte Siebold,
100 U.S. 371, 379-84, 397-98 (1879) (supervisors of elections appointed by judges); Hobson v. Han-
sen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 911-14 (D.D.C. 1967) (D.C. Board of Education).
3. Several recent Supreme Court separations of powers decisions have noted that there are three,
and only three, distinct branches of government; "independent" agencies, therefore, either are in one
of the three branches or they are unconstitutional. See Symposium on Administrative Law, The Un-
easy Constitutional Status of Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 276 (forthcoming 1987)
(discussing, inter alia, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951-52, 953 n.16 (1983); Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 118-41 (1976) (per curiam)); see also Note, Incorporation of Executive Agencies into the
Executive Branch, 94 YALE L.J. 1766 (1985). Of course, this is not a new concern. See, e.g., 1 K.
DAVsS, supra note 2, § 2.7.
4. The Attorney General has stated:
Agencies have no inherent lawmaking powers. They are not creatures of the Constitution....
This means we should abandon the idea that there are such things as "quasi-legislative" or
"quasi-judicial" functions that can be properly delegated to independent agencies or
bodies ...
... [Flederal agencies performing executive functions are themselves properly agents of the
executive. They are not "quasi" this, or "independent" that.
Address by Attorney General Edwin Meese III, Federal Bar Association, Detroit, Mich. (Sept. 13,
1985). The Justice Department took a similar position in litigation over the constitutionality of the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. See Brief for United States at 44-51, Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct.
3181 (1986) (No. 85-1377).
5. The tide of recent academic literature runs against agency autonomy. See Ledewitz, The Uncer-
tain Power of the President To Execute the Laws, 46 TENN. L. REV. 757, 803-04 (1979) (functions
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gress will lose the most practical6 of its few remaining tools for ensuring
federal administrative fidelity to legislative intentions. This Note argues,
however, that the Constitution permits Congress to create executive agen-
cies with substantial autonomy,' regardless of whether they are called
independent.
Because autonomy requires insulation from politically motivated re-
moval,8 Section I begins by analyzing the reach of the President's removal
power. It then offers a reinterpretation of terms in Humphrey's Executor
v. United States,9 the key modern case holding that Congress may con-
strain the President's removal power. Distinguishing between presidential
powers, which belong to the President alone, and more general executive
powers, which do not, allows Congress to use agency autonomy as a con-
straint on presidential discretion and gives Congress an option besides ac-
quiescence or impeachment when confronted by presidential disregard of
the legislative will.
Agency autonomy does not embrace the rejected concept of a plural ex-
may be vested in agencies independent of executive "policy control" only if President is allowed to
remove officials "for cause" including "failure of confidence"); Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986
Sup. CT. REv. 41 (forthcoming) (Congress may not forbid presidential removal of policy-making
official who refuses order to take legal act within official's jurisdiction); Strauss, The Place of Agencies
in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 625 (1984)
(offering several considerations, notably "fairness," that might affect the constitutionality of the inde-
pendent exercise of executive power, but in context of overriding desire for a "unitary, competent
President to serve as check against legislative hegemony"); Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Indepen-
dent Officers as Checks on Abuses of Executive Power, 63 B.U.L. REv. 59, 103 (1983) (suggesting
independent agencies be limited to "non-political" roles); Note, supra note 3, at 1766 (distinction
between executive and independent agencies "should now be discarded" in favor of full presidential
control).
6. The threat of agency autonomy is a more practical tool for checking the executive than are
statutes reducing executive discretion or setting penalties for violations. Such statutes would curtail
agencies' abilities to react to unforeseen contingencies, and would make complex programs impossible
by eliminating discretion to make rules filling out congressional intent. The threat of agency auton-
omy will color how Presidents and their subordinates use their discretion. See infra note 51. To date,
Congress' other attempts to shape this discretion have tended to fail. See infra note 40. In any case, a
statute setting penalites for, say, negligent or willful misconstruction of congressional intent might not
be enforced by the administration which chose the interpretation. Attempting to allow other parties a
right of action might create standing problems.
Autonomous agencies are a tool, not a panacea; they may, for example, be more subject to capture
by special interests than more politically accountable bodies. Congressional power to reduce presiden-
tial control does not necessarily translate into congressional control.
7. "Autonomy" in this Note refers to protection from political pressure by the President, most
commonly achieved by protecting high officials from dismissal without cause. See supra note 1.
8. See supra note 1. Even without the power to fire, the President's power to appoint top agency
personnel assures a high degree of control of agency activity. See Goodsell & Gayo, Appointive Con-
trol of Federal Regulatory Commissions, 23 ADMIN. L. REv. 291 (1971) (between 1945 and 1970,
enough commissioners on seven major regulatory commissions resigned before completion of statutory
term to allow newly-elected Presidents to appoint controlling majorities within average of 21 months).
However, agencies enjoy legal and psychological autonomy if Congress shields their chiefs from presi-
dential removal. Greater agency autonomy limits political manipulation by the President without nec-
essarily increasing congressional control. As political control and accountability to the President may
be desirable ends, agency autonomy may often be undesirable for policy reasons.
9. 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (unanimous decision).
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ecutive, nor does it amount to a fourth branch of government. Section II
demonstrates that the degree of autonomy implied by the presidential-
executive distinction is consistent with the constitutional text, structural
constitutional theory, the intent of the Framers, a long history of legisla-
tive practice, and much administrative history as well. Section III outlines
how the presidential-executive distinction can work in practice, and ap-
plies it to pending allegations that agencies whose top officials do not serve
at the pleasure of the President violate the separation of powers when
they take executive actions.
I. THE NEW THREAT TO AGENCY AUTONOMY
A. The Pending Issue
Emboldened by recent Supreme Court cases suggesting that the Presi-
dent has plenary power over the executive branch, and that congressio-
nally imposed constraints on the removal power may be unconstitu-
tional,1 ° private parties are increasingly challenging Congress' power to
insulate agencies such as the FTC or the Federal Reserve Board from
presidential control. 1 Most commonly, a plaintiff claims injuries caused
by authority constitutionally assigned to the executive branch but exer-
cised by an officer alleged to be outside it, or a defendant seeks to block an
administrative agency's investigation or enforcement action. These argu-
ments share three claims: (1) All high-ranking executive officials are con-
stitutionally removable by the President; (2) Any high-ranking official
who is not removable by the President is by definition not in the executive
10. See cases cited supra note 3. In Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976), the Supreme Court
explained why all Federal Election Commissioners needed to be appointed by the President: "[I]t is to
the President, and not to the Congress, that the Constitution entrusts the responsibility to 'take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed.'" See also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 750 (1982) ("The
President's unique status under the constitution distinguishes him from other executive officials.").
11. So far, these claims are failing in the lower courts. See Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875 (3d Cir.) (Comptroller General may intervene in military procurement
to ensure executive compliance with competitive bidding statute), affld on rehearing on other
grounds, No. 85-5226, slip. op. (3d Cir. Dec. 31, 1986); Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, No. 85-
3185, slip. op. (7th Cir. Dec. 18, 1986) (court will not reach issue because of inadequate briefing);
Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 625 F. Supp. 747 (D.D.C.) (denying separation of powers challenge to
FTC's civil enforcement power), appeal argued, No. 86-5087 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 20, 1986); Melcher v.
Federal Open Market Comm., 644 F. Supp. 510, 517-24 (D.D.C. 1986) (supplemental opinion)
(rejecting Senator's challenge to constitutionality of appointment of Federal Open Market Committee
by private individuals), appeal docketed, No. 86-5692 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 16, 1986); see also FTC v.
Engage-A-Car Servs., No. 86-3758 (D.N.J. Dec. 18, 1986) (claim that FTC enforcement power is
unconstitutional is "completely devoid of merit"); American Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. SEC, No. 86-3166
(S.D.N.Y. order Oct. 27, 1986) (claim dismissed on jurisdictional grounds); SEC v. Thomas, No. 86-
C-03313G (D.C. Utah minute order Oct. 14, 1986); FTC v. American Nat'l Cellular, Inc., Civ. No.
85-7375 WJR (C.D. Cal. transcript Feb. 26, 1986) (statement that Humphrey's Executor controls),
appeal argued No. 86-5760 (9th Cir. Oct. 2, 1986); SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., No. 80-Ml 125
(D. Col. July 29, 1986), appeal docketed No. 86-2319 (10th Cir. Aug 29, 1986). Cf SEC v. Warner,
Civ. Act. No. 86-6742 (D. Fla. argued Dec. 29, 1986).
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branch; (3) An agency headed by an official who is not in the executive
branch cannot constitutionally exercise any power that is reserved to the
executive branch. To date, the Supreme Court has endorsed only the third
claim."2 The Court should go no further.13
B. The Jurisprudential Roots of the Problem
The Constitution is silent on whether Congress or the President ulti-
mately controls the ordinary removal of high officials, 14 and the Supreme
Court has vacillated on the issue. At first the Court allowed Congress
freedom to define presidential authority over subordinate parts of the ex-
ecutive branch; later it suggested that the President possessed illimitable
removal power; then it reaffirmed congressional authority. Now the Court
has, at least in dicta, again approved presidential control."5
The early Court assumed that departments could have roles shielded
from presidential control."' In Kendall v. United States, 17 it explicitly
rejected the "alarming doctrine, that congress cannot impose upon any
executive officer any duty they may think proper." 8 Acknowledging that
the President's special constitutional status puts him "beyond the reach of
any other department," the Court explained that it "by no means follows,
12. In Bowsher, the Supreme Court construed statutes to find that the Comptroller General is in
the legislative branch, and hence cannot exercise budget-cutting powers under the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Act. The Court reserved judgment on the first two steps of the argument in the text. Bow-
sher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3188 n.4 (1986).
13. The Court's approach to Article I courts has tended to parallel its view of independent agen-
des: First, it applied the flexible approach, see Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 281-84 (1856) (Treasury may issue writ to collect tax liability); then, a
restrictive approach based on a formal view of the relationship between political branches, see Wil-
liams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 565-66 (1933) (Article I Court of Claims cannot partake of
Article III judicial power); next, a return to flexibility, see, e.g., Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S.
389 (1973) (D.C. Superior Court, established under art. I, § 8, cl. 17, can hear criminal case); Glid-
den Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 544-52 (1962) (opinion of Harlan, J.) (reversing Williams, supra,
reaffirming congressional power to place jurisdiction over public rights in Article I or Article III
court); finally, the threat of renewed formalism, see Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (bankruptcy court may not hear state law counterclaim because it is not
art. III court). If this parallelism continues it suggests that a retreat from formalism is due in the
agency area. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3256 (1986) (look-
ing beyond form to substance of agency's purpose to conclude that agency may hear state law counter-
claims despite Article I status).
14. Moreover, the debates at the Constitutional Conventions do not provide much illumination.
The delegates "displayed a notable lack of interest in the organization of the executive branch." L.
WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADM STRATIVE HISTORY 26 (1961).
15. See supra note 3. But see supra note 13 (retreat from formalism in related area).
16. See Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838) (Postmaster not subject to presi-
dential direction when executing purely ministerial task); see also Osborn v. Bank of United States,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (Second Bank of United States, majority of whose directors enjoy
autonomy from President, is constitutional); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)
(same).
17. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
18. Id. at 610. "[I]n such cases," the Court noted, "the duty and responsibility grow out of and
are subject to the control of the law, and not to the direction of the President." Id.
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that every officer in every branch of [a] department is under the exclusive
direction of the President."19
But in Myers v. United States,"0 the first modern case to examine the
extent to which an agency or its chief officer could be insulated from pres-
idential control, the Supreme Court held that a statute requiring Senate
concurrence in presidential removal of a first class postmaster was uncon-
stitutional.2 1 The theory and language of Myers were extraordinarily
broad, splitting federal power into three rigidly divided branches, with
administrative powers reserved largely to the President.22 Yet the holding
did no more than strike down the Senate's attempt to insert itself into the
removal mechanism.2" Properly understood, Myers stands only for the
proposition that Congress may not add to its constitutionally specified im-
peachment powers by asserting a veto power over removal of personnel
outside the legislative branch.24 The dicta in Myers would constrain Con-
gress far more, but the Court said the case presented only the question of
whether "the President has the exclusive power of removing executive of-
ficers of the United States."25 To rule that one house of Congress may not
require that the President get its assent in order to remove an executive
official is not necessarily to rule that Congress cannot constrain the Presi-
dent's removal power.26
This literal reading of Myers explains what otherwise seems to be a
rapid about-face in Humphrey's Executor v. United States,2 7 the corner-
19. Id. See also Gilchrist v. Collector of Charleston, 10 F. Cas. 355, 356 (C.C.D.S.C. 1808) (No.
5, 420) (Congress may vest final discretion to act in inferior officer).
20. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). Myers was the first case in which the Justice Department challenged the
constitutionality of a statute in court. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 97TH
CONG., 1ST SESS., PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF AGENCY RULEMAKING 19-20 (Comm. Print 1981)
[hereinafter RULEMAKING].
21. 272 U.S. at 176.
22. Id. at 116, 122-23. Chief Justice Taft based his ruling on an expansive reading of the take
care clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
23. By granting Congress the power to impeach civil officers of the United States, U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 3, cl. 6, the Constitution implicitly excludes other direct congressional participation in remov-
als. See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1402 n.31 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court) (per
curiam), affd on other grounds sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
24. Similarly, the Senate's role in the confirmation of Officers of the United States is limited to
advice and consent. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 137-41 (1976)
(per curiam), the Supreme Court struck down the provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971, 86 Stat. 3 (codified in relevant part at 2 U.S.C. § 437(c) (1976)), by which congressional
leaders appointed four members of the independent Federal Election Commission, as infringing on the
President's prerogative of appointment.
25. 272 U.S. at 106.
26. Justice Stevens appears to hold this view. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3195-96 (1986)
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). For a different reading of Myers, see Note, supra note 3, at
1767-68 (President has illimitable removal power over Officers of the United States).
27. 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (unanimous decision). Judges and commentators have often found it
difficult to reconcile the modern trilogy of Supreme Court removal cases (Myers, Humphrey's Execu-
tor, and Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958)). See, e.g., Synar v. United States, 626 F.
Supp. 1374, 1396-99, 1402 n.31 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court) (per curiam) (noting, however, that
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stone of agency independence today. In Humphrey's Executor the Court
swept away the dicta in Myers by upholding a statute insulating an FTC
Commissioner from removal by the President.2 Distinguishing "purely
executive" governmental functions in Myers that could not be committed
to so-called independent agencies, the Court located the FTC's role within
another, vague, class of functions that could constitutionally be committed
to officials at least partially shielded from presidential removal. The ele-
ments that belong to the latter group have been held to include legislative,
"quasi-legislative," and "quasi-judicial" powers and functions.29
C. The Presidential-Executive Distinction
Although it achieved the correct result, Humphrey's Executor obscured
the distinction between presidential functions, which the Constitution
reserves to the President,"0 and executive functions, which can be per-
formed by any official in the executive branch."1 The "purely executive"
Supreme Court's "signals are not sufficiently clear.., to justify our disregarding" Humphrey's Exec-
utor), affld sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
28. The Court based this ruling on its characterization of the FTC's duties as "neither political
nor executive." 295 U.S. at 624. Unless the Court unanimously mischaracterized it, the FTC's inclu-
sion among the not "purely executive" agencies means that whatever the term may mean in other
contexts, in removal jurisprudence "not purely executive" is a very broad class indeed. In 1935 the
FTC had responsibilities that most taxonomies would consider "executive," including bringing civil
enforcement actions. See id. at 619-20 (quoting Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914). Indeed,
until 30 years later, when it began issuing rules, the FTC exercised few if any of what are now styled
legislative or quasi-legislative functions. See National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d
672, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). Under the taxonomy suggested in this
Note most of the FTC's functions would be viewed as executive, but not presidential.
29. The issue of what Congress can constitutionally commit to officials at least partially shielded
from presidential removal arises on occasion before the Supreme Court in terms of what Congress
may delegate to "independent" agencies. Thus far, the permissible categories include vast rulemaking
powers, often styled "legislative," see, e.g., 1 K. DAvis, supra note 2, § 2.2; "quasi-legislative" pow-
ers, see, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302-03 (1979) (agencies may make substantive
rules, but only to extent specified by Congress); judicial power, see Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v.
Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 400 (1940) (Interstate Commerce Commission); and "quasi-judicial" powers,
see Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958) (War Claims Commission). But the Court has been
less clear about whether and to what extent independent agencies may constitutionally exercise execu-
tive powers.
30. Some of these functions, such as the veto power, cannot even be delegated to a fully removable
presidential agent. See infra notes 138-42 (presidential powers).
31. See infra notes 146-63 and accompanying text (examples). Despite the syntactical pairings of
the first three articles which "vest" powers, the terms "legislative Powers" and "a Congress"; "execu-
tive Power" and "a President"; and "judicial Power" and "one supreme Court" do not establish
equivalences. In law they each derive their meaning from the full text of the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article Ill. Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction 65
B.U.L. REV. 205, 221, 251 n.148, 252 n.151 (1985) (distinguishing between "judicial power" and
"supreme Court"). Despite the simplistic argument in Springer v. Government of Philippine Islands,
277 U.S. 189, 202-03 (1928) (construing Organic Act of Philippines), that the respective branches'
roles are self-evident, not everything Congress does conforms to the ideal type of legislation, nor is all
that the President does executive, nor even all that courts do judicial. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Yeazell,
The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980)
(describing judiciary branch's use of seemingly executive powers when managing institutions). How-
ever, there are indeed some functions that can properly be conducted by only one branch. E.g. military
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functions that Humphrey's Executor denies to agencies insulated from
presidential control are actually presidential functions; the "quasi" func-
tions that the Court has ruled may be performed by officials who, though
appointed by the President do not serve at pleasure, are executive but not
necessarily presidential. Seen in this light, the so-called "fourth branch of
government"32 is simply a particular type of executive agency.
33
Distinguishing between presidential and executive functions provides a
restrained ground for the Court's separation of powers jurisprudence .3  It
clearly defines each branch's role without questioning the holding of any
case, including Humphrey's Executor. Locating so-called independent
agencies in the non-presidential part of the executive branch resolves puz-
zling asymmetries as to what Congress can delegate to whom.35 This re-
definition also makes it clear that although Congress can protect many,
even most, executive tasks from presidential manipulation, it cannot shield
everything. Currently, with no clear definition of "purely executive,"
Congress can theoretically protect any office from being held at the Presi-
dent's pleasure by the admixture of some not purely executive functions.36
operations can only be conducted by persons in the executive branch (a category that includes the
President).
32. Justice Jackson's line about independent agencies is too often over-abbreviated. He called
them a "veritable fourth branch" of government. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952)
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
33. If the Comptroller General is in the legislative branch because Congress reserved itself the
power to remove him for cause, Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3189-91 (1986), then Presidential
removal for specified cause suffices for an officer to be in the executive branch. There is no reason to
read Article II as requiring more control than does Article I. This alone suffices to place most inde-
pendent agencies in the executive branch. See supra note I (independent agencies grouped by removal
provisions); see also infra text accompanying notes 78-84 (analogy to Article III suggests Congress
has great freedom to structure executive branch).
34. Reading the statutes creating independent agencies as having created agencies with autonomy
from presidential political direction but still within the executive branch would serve one of the first
values of constitutional adjudication, that of resolution of doubiful issues to avoid constitutional ques-
tions. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring in judgment).
35. Regarding "independent" agencies as highly autonomous parts of the executive branch has
theoretical advantages. The argument that "independent" agencies are outside the executive branch
and yet constitutional faces the obvious doctrinal difficulty that the Constitution speaks only of three
branches of government. Further, no such classification system can resolve the question of why, in
principle, the legislature should be permitted to assign "quasi-" legislative and judicial powers, but
not executive powers, to "independent" agencies.
The definitions in the text are consistent with the Court's holdings, if not all the dicta, in recent
separation of powers cases. For example, Buckley v. Valo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), correctly
identified the congressional attempt to appoint members of an agency with executive powers as an
usurpation of the appointment power. Id. at 137-41. Only the appointment of Officers of the United
States, judges and ambassadors is presidential-other parts of the appointment power are executive
and can even be judicial. See id. at 125-33; see also supra note 2. The definitions are also consistent
with the executive privilege cases. Even members of the Court who support expansive executive privi-
lege distinguish Congress' power to control executive departments from its power to control the Presi-
dent. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 513-14, 518 (1977) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
36. This hypothetical horrible may have provoked the suggestions that Humphrey's Executor
should be reversed. See supra note 5.
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Once the narrow set of presidential functions is understood and identified,
Congress should not be permitted to limit the President's control over
those functions.
37
D. Humphrey's Executor's Legacy
1. Reduced Congressional Authority in Modern Separation of Pow-
ers Jurisprudence
A misunderstanding of Myers and Humphrey's Executor, neglecting the
difference between presidential and executive powers, would be particu-
larly harmful today because of the direction of recent separation of powers
decisions reducing congressional authority relative to increasing presiden-
tial power."8 The Court's current approach permits Congress to delegate
virtually anything to the executive, 3  but restricts Congress' authority to
37. Chief Justice Taft's opinion in Myers, based on a historical reading of "the Decision of 1789,"
by which the first Congress was supposed to have determined that the President has illimitable re-
moval powers, forcefully stated the contrary view that Congress may rarely, if ever, limit the Presi-
dent's removal authority. 272 U.S. at 52-177. As the separate dissents by Justices McReynolds and
Brandeis (with which Justice Holmes "emphasizeld] my agreement," id. at 177) went to great pains
to demonstrate, Taft's reading of the legislative and judicial precedents was at best tendentious. Cf
Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining the Incidental Powers of the President and of the
Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, LAW & CONT MP.
PRoBs., Spring 1976, at 102, 115 ("Myers has been an embarrassment to the Supreme Court" be-
cause of Taft's reasoning). Perhaps the most striking flaw in Taft's historical survey was his exagger-
ation of both what was decided in 1789, and also the degree of unanimity the "decision" occasioned
then and later. See, e.g., Myers, 272 U.S. at 193-94, 208 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). id. at 240, 255
n.21 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Taft simply ignored the considerable number of actions by early Con-
gresses that contradict the supposedly definitive "decision." See infra notes 104-10 and accompanying
text; see also Myers, 272 U.S. at 199-202, 204 (McReynolds, J., dissenting); id. at 265-74 (Brandeis,
J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices also took issue with Chief Justice Taft's reading of almost
every removal case he cited.
The official who was the subject of the "Decision of 1789" was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, an
official who exercised powers that would be presidential under the definitions proposed in this Note.
See infra Section III.
38. L. FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING PowE- 247 (1975); Quint, The Separation of Powers
Under Carter, 62 TEx. L. REV. 785, 786 (1984); see also Polsby, A Critical Introduction, LAW &
CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1976, at 3, 7-8; Strauss, supra note 5, at 666-68.
39. See supra notes 1, 29. The Supreme Court has upheld creation of sweeping executive rule-
making power. E.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (broad grant of price-fixing author-
ity); see also Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 683-89 (1892) (cataloguing approvingly statutes that give
President wide discretion).
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attach strings to its delegations.40 The effect has been to strengthen the
executive greatly at Congress' expense.4
2. Congress Is Losing Control of Expenditures
Congress' control over money once it has been appropriated has been
attenuated.42 A recent case involving Congress' attempt to use the power
of the purse, Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,43
provides a striking example of the need for congressional power to insu-
late an agency from presidential faithlessness. Congress passed the 1984
Competition in Contracting Act44 (CICA) after years of exhorting and
ordering government agencies to avoid sole-source contracting in favor of
competitive bidding.45 A key element in CICA is a ninety-day automatic
freeze on the disbursement of most challenged contracts, pending review
by the Comptroller General.4 In his signing statement President Reagan
declared the administration's belief that CICA was unconstitutional.
47
40. The Court struck down the legislative veto on the grounds that any action that Congress takes
in order to alter "the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons, including . . . Executive Branch
officials[,] . . . outside the Legislative Branch" is legislative, and thus requires bicameralism and
presentment to President. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 95.2 (1983); see also Consumers Union of
United States, Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en bane) (per curiam) (striking down
two-house legislative veto), affd mem. sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy
Council of Am., 463 U.S. 1216, reh'g denied 463 U.S. 1250 (1983). The Court has held that Con-
gress cannot make appointments to non-legislative agencies. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per
curiam) (Congress may not make appointments to Federal Election Commission because agency has
executive functions). Similarly, the effectiveness of legislation contingent on a factual certification by
an executive branch official no longer seems a reliable device to control executive discretion. See Japan
Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986) (denying mandamus to force
Secretary of Commerce to issue certification).
41. Chemerinsky, A Paradox Without a Principle: A Comment on the Burger Court's Jurispru-
dence in Separation of Powers Cases, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming 1987). A major factor contrib-
uting to this trend has been the Supreme Court's willingness to sever Congress' unconstitutional at-
tempts to make contingent delegations, particularly the legislative veto, from statutes creating
executive discretion. See, e.g., Chadha, 462 U.S. at 1013-16 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
42. L. FISHER, supra note 38.
43. 787 F.2d 875 (3d Cir.), affid on rehearing on other grounds, No. 85-5226, slip. op. (3d Cir.
Dec. 31, 1986).
44. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1199 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3556 (Supp. 11 1984)).
45. See Ameron, 787 F.2d at 879 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1157, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1984)).
Earlier laws already required maximum feasible competition. Yet, in fiscal year 1983 only $54
billion of $168 billion in military procurement was opened to competition. Id. The Department of
Defense opposed competitive bidding; without an adequate administrative protest system by which
disappointed bidders could quickly make their complaints known, corrective action was impossible.
CICA sought to create such a system. See H.R. REP. No. 138, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-5 (1985)
[hereinafter CICA REPORT].
46. 31 U.S.C. § 3554 (Supp. 11 1984). CICA does not apply when the head of a procuring
department certifies in writing that there are "urgent and compelling circumstances which signifi-
cantly affect interests of the United States [and] will not permit waiting for the decision of the Comp-
troller General." Id. at § 3553(c)(2).
47. Statement on Signing H.R. 4170 into Law, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1037 (July 18,
1984). A major allegation in Ameron was that the Comptroller General's authority to alter the length
of the stay, 31 U.S.C. § 3554 (Supp. 111984), usurped the executive function of controlling procure-
ment. Ameron, 787 F.2d at 878-79. On rehearing, however, the Third Circuit characterized the in-
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The Office of Management and Budget issued a bulletin instructing agen-
cies to ignore CICA. 8 The administration's opposition to CICA
culminated in a threat by the Attorney General not to comply with any
lower federal court ruling upholding CICA.49 Only this last ultima-
tum-not the refusal to enforce a law passed by Congress and signed by
the President-stirred a Congressional counter-threat to cut the appropri-
ation for the salaries of top Justice Department officials. 50
3. Agency Autonomy Seeks To Discourage Presidential Abuses
The CICA episode demonstrates that the power to place-or threaten
to place-certain types of administrative decisions beyond a President's
political reach is a highly practical tool for Congress to institutionalize
executive compliance with congressional intent. 51 Other attempts to con-
trol the misuse of discretion delegated to the executive branch are limited
by Congress' diffuse and relatively slow decisionmaking.52 For example,
the disciplinary power of the purse-theoretically Congress' main weapon
against presidential abuses-is constrained by the low credibility of a
trusive effect of this power as "de minimis." Ameron v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 85-
5226, slip. op. at 40 (3d Cir. Dec. 31, 1986).
48. Ameron, 787 F.2d at 880 (citing OMB Bulletin No. 85-8 at 2 (Dec. 17, 1984)).
49. Ameron, 787 F.2d at 889-90 (Attorney General Meese's statement that District Court is not
"court of competent jurisdiction," and that Third Circuit ruling might be ignored). Ultimately, the
administration did acknowledge that it would comply with the District Court order to uphold CICA,
and with the Third Circuit's modification of the order. Id. at 890.
50. New York Times, May 9, 1985, at A28, col. I (Meese testimony "major provocation" for vote
to cut Justice Department salaries); CICA REPORT, supra note 45, at 39-40; see also id. at 44-45
(description of other, unpunished, violations by executive branch).
51. Congress' power to threaten to insulate a post from the President's political control may in-
crease congressional confidence in presidential implementation and thus promote grants of discretion
to the President, which might be desirable. In general, presidential discretion promotes administrative
flexibility and the gains incident to centralization, accountability, coordination, and efficiency. See
Note, supra note 3, at 1773-74 (citing authority). However, wide discretion also increases the Presi-
dent's ability to disregard the legislature's objectives. In order to grant discretion, Congress needs to
believe that those entrusted with implementation will faithfully adopt its policy choices. Reserving the
threat of insulation increases Congress' chances of having its will obeyed. Admittedly, this is an ideal-
ized model. At times compromises required to pass legislation result in a measure that obscures con-
gressional intent. See, e.g., DeLong, New Wine for a New Bottle: Judicial Review in the Regulatory
State, 72 VA. L. REv. 399, 425-27 (1986). Nevertheless, courts somehow manage to discern legisla-
tive intent.
52. Congress has devised mechanisms to encourage execution of laws in accordance with legisla-
tive intent. See Franck & Bob, The Return of Humpty-Dumpty: Foreign Relations Law After the
Chadha Case, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 912, 921-28, 944-51 (1985) (summarizing types of control used by
Congress). Among these mechanisms are the creation of independent sources of information, a vast
expansion of the congressional staff system, and increased oversight. See Tiefer, supra note 5, at
60-61. However, congressional oversight occurs long after the fact of executive malfeasance. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Times, July 14, 1986, at A3, col. 1 (Congressman and GAO accuse Department of Defense of
mischaracterizing large projects as many small projects, including accounting for each shower stall in
building as separate "construction project," to evade statutory spending limits on individual military
bases in Honduras).
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threat to use it on any project of political significance."3 In any case, Con-
gress should not be forced to cut a desired program, with the risk of com-
promising vital military procurement or the interests of innocent benefi-
ciaries, because the branches are fighting."
Congress always retains its ultimate weapon of impeachment."5 But
without any intermediate threats in its arsenal, Congress faces stark
choices when confronted with executive misconduct: It can acquiesce in
nullification of laws by the executive, it can refuse to fund programs be-
cause it distrusts executive implementation, or it can attempt impeachment
in circumstances that may not seem to justify such a drastic step. 6 Agency
autonomy gives Congress another option, one which this Note argues is
practical and constitutional.
II. CONGRESS' POWER To LIMIT PRESIDENTIAL REMOVAL
The President's enumerated power to appoinit57 has been held to con-
note an inherent or implied power to remove,58 as have other clauses of
Article II. Careful examination of constitutional theory, administrative
history, and judicial precedent, however, demonstrates that this removal
power is not absolute, and that Congress may thus constrain it by statute
to create a degree of agency autonomy. Such constraints derive part of
their legitimacy from Congress' power to create and structure the entire
executive branch other than the President and Vice President.
53. See L. FIsHER, supra note 38, at 262 (practicalities of government require that Congress give
President spending discretion). Of course, Congress has informal control mechanisms available. See
supra note 52.
54. While in the Ameron case Congress ultimately did threaten to cut the Justice Department
appropriation, it did so only because Justice was seen as challenging the rule of law. At no time did
Congress threaten to cut the military budget to emphasize its determination that contracts be awarded
competitively, and it is doubtful that such a threat would have been credible.
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. § 3, ci. 6. It is also true that Congress can block the
President's appointments, but this strategy can paralyze government.
56. As long as Congress retains the power of impeachment, it has the power to enforce presiden-
tial obedience. But since Congress reserves this power for the most serious offenses, Presidents enjoy
great freedom of maneuver if no intermediate sanctions exist. Impeachment remains a great constitu-
tional counterweight, but its very gravity makes it a poor weapon. See Tiefer, supra note 5, at 99
n.187. Also, impeachment is a long and messy affair, capable of paralyzing both Congress (especially
the Senate, which must interrupt regular business to try impeachments) and the bureau or agency
whose chief is on trial.
57. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
58. Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 318 (1903); Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
230, 259 (1839). "It is the starting point of all judicial analysis in this area that the President's power
to remove, however much it may be restricted, derives from the constitutional grant of his power to
appoint . . . ." Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1402 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court) (per
curiam) (citation omitted), affd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
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A. Constitutional Theory
1. Textual Argument
a. The Constitution Vests Only Limited Powers in the President
"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America."'59 Might this vesting of executive power command that
the President exercise all of it personally, or perhaps personally control its
subdelegation? Both a literal and a structural 0 analysis suggest not: The
executive power of the United States is not uniquely vested in the Presi-
dent alone, just as the President's functions are not solely executive. 61 Ar-
ticle II clearly anticipates that there will be "Heads of Departments," and
that Congress may, if it chooses, grant them-not the President-the im-
portant discretion to appoint inferior officials.6 2 If Heads of Departments
were utterly subject to presidential discretion, the provision would be
meaningless; the President would in any case be able to regulate the selec-
tion, if not the actual appointment, of inferior officials.6 3 Similarly, the
wording of the necessary and proper clause6 supports the constitutional
validity of the distinction between the President and the executive branch,
because it specifically includes departments and officers in a list of poten-
tial repositories of federal authority. Further, the power to "make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution...
all... Powers vested.., in any Department or Officer ' 65 gives Congress
a textual claim to determine fully the nature of executive offices. Congress
can assign a Head of Department any executive power not textually re-
served to the President in Article II.6"
To say that the first sentence of Article II vests executive powers in the
59. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
60. On the structural method of constitutional analysis, see C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELA-
TIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969); see also Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Pow-
ers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REV. 101, 112-13 (1984) (balance among branches is a key structural
concern).
61. The President's veto of legislation is an example of a legislative power.
62. "[T]he Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officials, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments . .. ." U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
63. See United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886) (Congress may insulate cadet engineer, an
inferior official, from removal, when appointment of official is vested in Secretary of the Navy, an
Officer of the United States); see also RULEMAKING, supra note 20, at 31-34 (collecting lower court
cases).
64. Congress may "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execu-
tion ... all other Powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See Elliott, supra note 1, at 142, 175.
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added).
66. See Van Alstyne, supra note 37, at 115-17 (necessary and proper clause is more compelling
locus of power to structure executive branch than clauses cited by Chief Justice Taft in Myers); see
also Black, The Working Balance of the American Political Departments, I HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
13, 15-16 (1974).
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President begs the question of what those powers are.67 If it were possible
to give content to the President's power without recourse to the text of the
constitutional article that purports to define that office, then presumably
the first three articles of the Constitution could each have been expressed
in a sentence. Those three articles do list the areas in which a branch can
go beyond its paradigmatic function,"' but their primary purpose remains
to define the contours of each branch and of offices within each branch.
b. Reading the Take Care Clause with the Opinion in Writing
Clause
The constitutional provision that the President "shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed"6" offers the strongest support for full presi-
dential control over the executive. Yet, the take care clause is not among
the major presidential powers of section two, and seems to be at most a
modest grant of power.70 Among the powers explicitly granted to the
President is the power to "require the Opinion, in writing, of the princi-
pal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relat-
ing to the Duties of their respective Offices." 7' A broad reading of the
take care clause has the effect of reducing this clause-which appears
among the grant of major presidential powers in section two-to surplus-
age. If the President has so much control over the executive that he can
fire at will, why put the power to request written opinions in the
Constitution?
The Constitution should not be read to have such redundancy.72 A
more reasonable interpretation is that the opinion in writing clause exists
because it was not assumed, or at the very least not obvious, that the
President had absolute power over Heads of Departments.73 The take
67. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640-41 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
68. For example, the legislature has judicial power to try impeachments; the President has legisla-
tive power through the veto.
69. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
70. The take care clause is listed among the miscellaneous powers in art. II, § 3. The take care
clause's position makes it appear "almost as an afterthought." J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCESS 110 (2d ed. 1985).
71. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
72. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
73. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640-41 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring); see also Ledewitz, supra note 5; Tiefer, supra note 5. The surviving records of the
Constitutional Convention are not very informative about the gestation or purpose of the opinion in
writing clause. See 2 RECORDS OF THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 158,
336-37, 342-43, 367, 495, 541-43, 575, 599, 627 (M. Farrand ed. 1966) (history of clause's adop-
tion). It was debated only once, briefly. See id. at 541-42. Passage of the opinion in writing clause
was tied to the rejection of a council to advise the President. See id. Immediately after the Council of
State was defeated by a vote of 8-3, it was agreed, with only New Hampshire dissenting, to
"authoriz[e] the President to call for the opinions of the Heads of Departments, in writing." Id. at
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care clause says only that the President "shall Take Care that the laws be
faithfully executed," regardless of who executes them-a duty quite dif-
ferent from the single-handed responsibility for executing all the laws. A
literal reading of the take care clause confirms the President's duty to
ensure that officials obey Congress' instructions; it does not create a presi-
dential power so great that it can be used to frustrate congressional inten-
tions. 4 The take care clause should not be read to grant the President the
power to set the political agenda of agencies, nor to replace agency per-
sonnel because they enforce congressional mandates in a manner that con-
flicts with the President's political predilections.75 Rather, the President's
irreducible constitutional role in overseeing the execution of congressional
policies is one of general leadership and persuasion,7 initiating personnel
reviews, monitoring to see that officials stay within the bounds that Con-
gress has assigned to them, and perhaps initiating dismissal proceedings
before an administrative or judicial tribunal.7
2. Structural Constitutional Argument
a. Article II's Parallels to Article III
Article II contains little more information about Congress' relation to
Heads of Departments and inferior officers than Article III contains about
542-43. Both sides in the debate apparently agreed that without either opinion in writing or a Coun-
cil of State the President could not be assured of adequate information from aides; it was not assumed,
therefore, or at least not obvious, that the President had absolute power over Heads of Departments.
Curiously, Colonel Mason believed that the rejection of a Council of State weakened the President.
Id. at 639 (reprinting Mason's contemporaneous "Objections to this Constitution of Government").
74. See Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
75. "The constitution assigns to Congress the power of designating the duties of particular of-
ficers: the President is only required to take care that they execute them faithfully .... He is not to
perform the duty, but to see that the officer assigned by law performs his duty faithfully-that is,
honestly: not with perfect correctness of judgment, but honestly." 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 624, 626 (1823)
(Wirt) (emphasis in original).
76. The Presidency carries tremendous persuasive power over even nominally independent agen-
cies. The Constitution gives the President this consultative role. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d
298, 404-06 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (President may discuss proposed rulemaking with agency after close of
public comment period). Professor Strauss suggests that the opinion in writing clause itself should be
read as defining a floor level of Presidential involvement in agency affairs. Under this view, the clause
empowers the President to preview all agency actions, if only to give him a chance to exercise his
powers of persuasion. Strauss, supra note 5, at 646-48; see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United
States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 598 F.2d 759, 775-76 (3d Cir. 1979) (independent agency may
allow itself to be persuaded by President).
Congress appears to be aware of the potency of the President's persuasion. See 12 U.S.C. § 250
(1982) ("No officer or agency of the United States" may require Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, or National Credit Union Administration to seek advance approval for any
communication to Congress if such communication includes a statement that it "do[es] not necessarily
represent the views of the President").
77. The argument in the text refers only to the minimum that the Constitution guarantees the
President, not to what prudence or good administrative practice suggests that Congress grant him.
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Congress' relation to inferior federal courts. Yet, it is rarely disputed that
Congress has broad, even unlimited, powers to structure the inferior fed-
eral courts.78 Congress may even restrict the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction,7 9 at least up to a point.80 Just as Congress may determine
which Article III court will hear cases, so too can Congress determine
which agency will execute its policies.8"Just as Congress can insulate in-
78. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1; Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-50 (1850) (lower
court cannot take jurisdiction forbidden by statute); see also Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,
551 (1962) (opinion of Harlan, J.) (Congress not required to create inferior federal courts); Lockerty
v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187-88 (1943) (same); Federal Power Comm'n v. Pacific Power & Light
Co., 307 U.S. 156, 159 (1939) (Congress sets jurisdiction of inferior courts). But see Eisenberg, Con-
gressional Authority To Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974) (lower
courts now constitutionally required).
79. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wail.) 506 (1868) (Congress
may restrict appellate jurisdiction). See generally Amar, supra note 31 (proposing "neo-federalist"
theory of when this is appropriate).
80. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 144-48 (1871) (distinguishing congres-
sional power to limit Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction from impermissible attempt to determine
outcome of pending litigation); Glidden, 370 U.S. at 605 n.11 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("There is a
serious question whether the McCardle case [see supra note 79] could command a majority view
today."); see also Hart, The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362 (1953) (limits to congressional power). Contra Wechs-
lcr, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 CoLum. L. REv. 1001 (1965).
81. Denying that Congress has plenary power to structure the executive branch forces one to
make odd arguments. See, e.g., Comment, Abolition of Federal Offices as an Infringement on the
President's Power To Remove Federal Executive Officers: A Reassessment of Constitutional Doc-
trines, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 562, 590-93 (1974) (Congress may not abolish agency if purpose is to
remove particular official).
One of the greatest virtues of the executive-presidential distinction is that it offers a middle ground
for decision in separation of powers cases other than a retreat to nonjusticiability. The stakes in
removal cases-control of the federal machinery-too often create a hydraulic pressure toward absolu-
tism. For example, to argue that the President has illimitable removal power, as Chief Justice Taft
did in Myers, calls into question Congress' ability to create offices with limited terms, and undermines
its ability to create terms of more than four years. Yet, it is as odd to say that Congress could not
shorten the terms of FTC Commissioners to one year as it would be to suggest that every Article III
judge's life tenure prohibits Congress from reducing her court's jurisdiction. See Glidden, 370 U.S. at
567-68 (opinion of Harlan, J.) (Congress may narrow jurisdiction of courts, even if this affects pend-
ing cases). It might be less odd to limit this claim to sitting Commissioners. Contra Comment, supra,
at 585-94. But if the President has illimitable removal power, then Congress should not be allowed to
limit the terms of those yet to be named, for this too usurps the removal power. Yet, this last argu-
ment cannot be correct as it is tantamount to arguing that a court can require Congress to fund an
office not specified in the Constitution, despite the clear command of the appropriations clause, U.S.
CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. See Glidden, 370 U.S. at 534 (opinion of Harlan, J.) (Congress may repeal
tenure or salary of public officials, but not of art. III judges); Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99,
107-08 (1890) (same).
Admitting Congress' power to create offices with terms of its choosing, however, opens the equally
absolute possibility of major offices-even Cabinet posts-with terms so short that the Senate would
have an effective power of removal through its ability to withhold consent from reappointment. The
Court's holding in Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3189-91 (1986) (Congress' statutory reserva-
tion of power to remove Comptroller General by passing joint resolution-a statute-made him of-
ficer of legislative branch), raises the specter of a similar analysis being applied if the official's term
were anything but co-extensive with the President's or the life of the agency, whichever is less. Cf
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (Court avoids deciding claim that bill to cut off salaries
of 39 named alleged subversives, unless reappointed by President, encroaches on executive power;
holds instead that act was invalid bill of attainder).
Courts have allowed retroactive extentions of terms. See, e.g., Koerner v. Colonial Bank, 800 F.2d
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ferior federal courts from Supreme Court review, 2 so too, by analogy, 3
can Congress put stringent limits on the President's control of agen-
cies 84 -except, of course, for those functions textually committed to the
President.
b. Limited Foreign Policy Powers Analogized to Domestic Powers
The President's war and foreign affairs powers extend further than
presidential domestic powers. The President is Commander in Chief of
the armed forces, not Commander in Chief of the entire government. As
Commander in Chief, the President ordinarily has considerably more au-
thority and independence from Congress in the military sphere than in
domestic affairs. Similarly, the President ordinarily enjoys broader au-
thority and initiative in foreign affairs.8 5 If Congress can constrain the
President's use of his inherent Commander in Chief or foreign affairs
powers, it follows that Congress can apply at least as strong constraints to
the removal power, an unenumerated, allegedly inherent, domestic power.
One recent analysis of the President's war and foreign affairs powers
concluded that the "cases stand quite plainly for the proposition that the
President can exercise a purportedly inherent power if Congress has his-
torically acquiesced and if Congress does not try to stop him."8' Congress
has placed restrictions on the President's ability to dismiss a commissioned
officer in peacetime;87 it should be able to do no less with regard to do-
1358 (5th Cir. 1986) (upholding Bankruptcy Amendments & Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 98 Stat.
333, 346 Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 121(e), 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (July 10, 1984),
which retroactively extended terms of all bankruptcy judges whose commissions had expired June 27);
In re Benny, 791 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1986) (same). Similar issues would arise if Congress passed a
prospective increase in an official's term.
82. Amar, supra note 31, at 257-58 ("The power to structure the federal judiciary is not trivial;
it has real bite. It comprehends the power to create an unreviewable Article III Tax Court--or an
Abortion Court." (footnote omitted)).
83. On the virtues of analogies in constitutional interpretation, see C. BLACK, supra note 60, at
3-32; Amar, supra note 31, at 252 n.151, 253-54 (discussing analogies between art. II and art. III).
84. These limits do not remove the agency from the executive branch. See supra note 33.
85. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. 299 U.S. 304, 315-18 (1936); see also United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (rejecting executive privilege claim lacking assertion of
"claim of privilege on the ground they are military or diplomatic secrets"); Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 630-32 (Douglas, J., concurring), 640-41 (Jackson, J., concur-
ring) (1952) (President may not invoke war powers to seize domestic steel mills).
86. Carter, supra note 60, at 124 (emphasis in original). Professor Carter cautions that the intent
of the Framers was "ambiguous," id. at 119, and that the older judicial precedents are "thin," id. at
120, but that nevertheless, "[t]he Court has been quite explicit in its avoidance" of defining Congress'
power to limit the Commander in Chief power. Id. at 120 n.83 (citing cases in which Supreme Court
notes congressional inaction); see also Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177-78 (1804) (con-
gressional action, regarding authority of naval forces to seize foreign vessels, occupies field otherwise
open to President's discretion); Van Alstyne, supra note 37, at 107 (necessary and proper clause
assigns Congress authority to determine what powers executive will have beyond those deemed
"indispensable").
87. 10 U.S.C. § 1161 (1982) forbids the dismissal of a commissioned officer in peacetime unless
the officer is convicted by court-martial, absent without leave for three months, or sentenced to incar-
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mestic agency heads. Since the unfettered presidential removal power is at
most an "inherent" power,a8 the comparison to inherent war and foreign
affairs powers suggests that Congress may "try to stop" the President
from removing Heads of Departments.
3. The Intent of the Framers
Separation of powers implements the Framers' chief goal subordinate to
the overriding aim of creating a functioning state-that of preventing a
recurrence of the tyranny they associated with English rule. Montesquieu,
an important influence on the Framers,"9 emphasized separation of gov-
ernment into starkly divided branches not as an end in itself, but as a
means to protect against the tyranny that would result were powers con-
centrated in one branch or, worse, in one person.90 Separation of powers
is best understood as the structural realization of Montesquieu's goal of
maximum feasible diffusion of power."1 It should not be understood to
require concentration of power in any one branch, and particularly not
concentration of power in the executive branch, much less in the
President."3
The Framers envisioned Congress as the most powerful of the three
branches. 93 The Framers saw Congress as the branch that could most
safely be entrusted with the greatest power; concentration of power in
unelected judges or in a single President too closely resembled the abuses
associated with English rule. The Framers expected the President's do-
mestic powers to be far less than the domestic powers of Congress.9 4 Their
ceration by final order of a civilian court. See also Wallace v. United States, 257 U.S. 541, reh'g
denied 258 U.S. 216 (1922) (limitations on President's power to remove army officer reduced when
President acts with consent of Senate); cf McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426 (1880) (purpose
of predecessor statute was to restrict broad wartime dismissal powers in peacetime).
88. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
89. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 34, 199 n.3
(1969).
90. See id. at 151-54, 449-51; H. MERRY, MONTESQUIEU'S SYSTEM OF NATURAL GOVERN-
MENT, 316-19, 352-57 (1970); T. PANGLE, MONTESQUIEU'S PHILOSOPHY OF LIBERALISM 130-33
(1973).
91. "Even a cursory examination of the Constitution reveals the influence of Montesquieu's thesis
that checks and balances were the foundation of a structure of government that would protect liberty."
Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3186 (1986); cf. THE FEDERALiST No. 47, at 313-16 (J.
Madison) (E. Earle ed. 1937) (quoting Montesquieu); id. No. 51, at 337 (J. Madison) (separation of
powers will "oblige it [government] to control itself").
92. "When Americans in 1776 spoke of keeping the several parts of the government separate and
distinct, they were primarily thinking of insulating the judiciary and particularly the legislature from
executive manipulation." G. WOOD, supra note 89, at 157.
93. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (J. Madison) (discussing superiority of legislature); id. No. 51,
at 338 (J. Madison) (E. Earle ed. 1937) ("In republican government, the legislative authority neces-
sarily predominates"); G. WOOD, supra note 89, at 155 (American Revolution "intensified legislative
domination of the other parts of the government").
94. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrTIONAL LAW 161, 181 (1978); Zamir, Administrative Con-
trol of Administrative Action, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 866, 869-71 (1969). The imbalance in favor of
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intentions9 5 suggest that Congress retains great latitude to structure the
executive branch,96 just as it may structure the judicial branch.9 Of
course, there are limits. The President has certain enumerated powers,98
and the Supreme Court has functions that Congress may not erode. 9 Fur-
ther, Congress may not delegate power to a legislative rump,100 or to a
legislative agency. 101
B. Historical Allocation of Removal Power
Early congressional and presidential practices conformed to the view
that the Constitution did not grant the President unlimited power to re-
move Heads of Departments.10 2 Presidential authority to supervise, and
hence remove,103 officials varied with the nature of their function. The
first Congresses gave the President the power to direct the Heads of De-
partments for Foreign Affairs,104 War,10 5 and Navy 06-authority that re-
Congress was consistent with the models provided by all the states at the time the Constitution was
drafted. In 1787, no state constitution gave the executive illimitable removal powers. Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 247-48 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
95. On problems with modern attempts to find "original understandings" of the Constitution, see
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980); Powell,
The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REV. 885 (1985) (Framers did not
intend us to be bound by their intent). See generally J. SwiFT, A Tale of A Tub, in JONATHAN
SwiFr 81 (A. Ross & D. Wooley eds. 1984) (need for empathy with author's circumstances to under-
stand his work).
96. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 439-46 (1977) (Congress may
structure executive's disposition of presidential papers); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694-96
(1974) (President must use ordinary channels to rescind regulation governing Special Prosecutor in
order not to be bound by it); see also THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 51 (J. Madison) (legislative role
most important in separation of powers); THE FEDERALIST No. 77 (A. Hamilton) (same).
97, See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
98. See infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
99. See Amar, supra note 31, at 239-59 (distinguishing limitable from illimitable jurisdiction of
Supreme Court). Nor may Congress expand these functions beyond a certain point. Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
100. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118-41 (1976) (per curiam).
101. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3186-93 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952
(1983).
102. See 3 W. WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1479-80
(2d ed. 1929); see also R. HARLOW, THE HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE METHODS IN THE PERIOD
BEFORE 1825, at 130-34, 140-46, 157-59 (early congressional efforts to structure executive branch);
Sofaer, Practice Under the Framers, LAW & CoNTEMp. PROBs., Spring 1976, at 12, 37 ("No early
President suggested that Congress was significantly limited in the control it potentially had over as-
signed executive powers."); supra note 37 (misunderstanding of "Decision of 1789"). Contra L.
WHITE, supra note 14, at 17-18.
103. Legislators at the time were keenly aware that power to remove implies power to control. See
L. FISHER, THE CONSTITUTION BETWEEN FRIENDS 52-54 (1978) (citing authorities).
104. Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4, § 1, 1 Stat. 28, 28-29 (Secretary shall perform duties as enjoined
by President).
105. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 49, 49-50 (Secretary shall perform duties as President
shall instruct).
106. Act of April 30, 1798, ch. 35, § 1, 1 Stat. 553, 553 (Secretary's duty shall be to execute
President's orders).
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lated to specifically named presidential functions in Article 11.107 But the
two other executive departments-the Post Office 08 and the Trea-
sury1 9-were more insulated from presidential direction, with the latter
tied particularly closely to Congress.'1 Most Attorney Generals agreed
with, or acquiesced in, the congressional view for the first seventy-five
years of the Republic. 11
From the beginning, Congress not only restricted the President's au-
thority to fire executive officials, but also narrowed the appointment
power from which the removal power primarily derives." 2 Congress' un-
disputed power to create an office includes the corollary power to narrow
the group from which the President may select civil officers. Congress has
required that certain appointees have particular citizenship 13 or residence
in a particular state, territory, or foreign country;'1 4 it has required legal
qualifications,115 language proficiency, 1  and engineering17 or other pro-
fessional credentials.11 8 Further, at times Congress has constrained the
President's appointment power by specifying the appointee's age, '
sex, 20 race, 21 property holdings, 22 business, 23 or drinking habits.124
107. For example, the Commander-in-Chief function, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, and the
receiving of ambassadors, id. § 3.
108. Act of May 8, 1794, ch. 23, § 3, 1 Stat. 354, 357 ("Postmaster shall have authority to
act . . . ."). Compare id. with Act of Sept. 22, 1789, ch. 41, § 1, 1 Stat. 70 (temporary establishment
of Post Office; Postmaster General "subject to the directions of the President").
109. Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 65.
110. The statute nowhere mentions the President, but rather requires the Secretary to make re-
ports to Congress and "generally ... perform all such services relative to the finances, as he shall be
directed to perform." Id. ch. 12, § 2, 1 Stat. 65, 66; see also J. MASHAw & R. MEsRRILL, supra note
70, at 155-56 (noting distinction).
111. For example,
If the laws, then, require a particular officer by name to perform a duty, not only is that
officer bound to perform it, but no other officer can perform it without a violation of the law;
and were the President to perform it, he would not only be not taking care that the laws were
faithfully executed, but he would be violating them himself.
1 Op. Att'y Gen. 624, 625 (1823) (Wirt); accord 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 28 (1869) (Hoar); 6 Op. Att'y
Gen. 226 (1853); 4 Op. Att'y Gen. 515, 516 (1846) (Mason); 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 507 (1832) (Taney);
cf. RuLEMAKING, supra note 20, at 32 n.154 (citing other examples drawn from 1823 to 1876).
Contra Letter from Attorney General Caesar A. Rodney to President Thomas Jefferson (July 15,
1808), reprinted in 10 F. Cas. 357-59 (courts lack jurisdiction to issue mandamus against officer
following presidential directive; granting such writs would destroy executive branch); 7 Op. Att'y
Gen. 453, 469-70 (1855) (Cushing) (other view would "so divide and transfer the executive power as
utterly to subvert the Government").
112. See supra note 58.
113. E.g. Act of Mar. 1, 1855, ch. 133, § 9, 10 Stat. 619, 623 (requiring U.S. citizenship for all
diplomatic officials); see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 265 n.35 (1926) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (collecting statutes).
114. Myers, 272 U.S. at 267-68 & nn.37-42, 272 n.54 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 267 n.43 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 268 n.43 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 268-69 n.43 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 269 n.43 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 270 n.46 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 270 n.47 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (statutes requiring female appointee).
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Most of these statutes applied to federal officials below Cabinet rank, al-
though all were "Officers of the United States" and many had no superior
officer except, perhaps, the President. Nor are restrictions on the appoint-
ment power an historical relic: Since 1947, a person must have been a
civilian for ten years to be eligible for appointment as Secretary of De-
fense or to other top Defense Department posts.12 5 In addition, the Presi-
dent continues to be required to nominate some officials from different
parties, 12 or on a nonpartisan basis.1 27 At times, Congress has limited the
President's choice to lists nominated by state officials, Indian tribes, or
private citizens. 28 The limits of the congressional authority to define or
restrict the presidential appointment power have never been tested. 2 "
C. Historical Allocation of Related Powers
Executive departments shielded from presidential control are a tradi-
tional, if relatively infrequently employed, congressional technique to en-
sure that important national tasks are accomplished when there is reason
to fear presidential influence over implementation. Early examples of vest-
ing important government functions in independent corporations, notably
the Second Bank of the United States, appear functionally identical to the
modern practice of vesting such powers in independent agencies.1 " The
Second Bank of the United States was a federally chartered corporation,
but only one-fifth of its stock was owned by the United States. The Bank
121. Id. at 271 n.48 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (statutes requiring Native American appointee).
122. Id. at 271 n.49 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 271 n.53 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
124. Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, § 8, 22 Stat. 403, 406 (requiring temperance).
125. 10 U.S.C. § 133(a) (1982) (Secretary of Defense); id. § 134 (Deputy Secretary); id. § 135
(Under Secretary); see also 42 U.S.C. § 5812(a) (1982) (Administrator of Energy Research and De-
velopment shall have been civilian for at least two years).
126. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 271 n.51 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). A number
of modem statutes include this requirement. E.g. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(1) (1982) (Federal Election Com-
mission); 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1982) (Federal Trade Commission); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d(a) (West Supp.
1986) (Securities and Exchange Commission).
127. Myers, 272 U.S. at 271 n.52 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Compare 44 U.S.C.A. § 2103(a)
(West Supp. 1986) (Archivist of the United States "shall be appointed without regard to political
affiliations and solely on the basis of the professional qualifications required.") with N.Y. Times,
Sept. 11, 1986, at A22, col. 1 (two Senators accuse White House staff of questioning candidates for
Archivist post about their political beliefs).
128. Myers, 272 U.S. at 274 n.56 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
129. Congress' power to define the procedures by which lower-level federal employees are selected
was affirmed in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (upholding Hatch Act); see
also United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886) (affirming congressional power to constrain presi-
dential flexibility in appointment of inferior officers). The issue of Congress' power to define such
procedures for higher-level officials is unlikely to arise in court because they require Senate confirma-
tion. Were the President ever to appoint a person in violation of a statute, the Senate presumably
would not confirm her.
130. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (upholding constitutionality of
Second Bank of the U.S.).
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 96: 787, 1987
had twenty-five directors, five of whom were appointed by the President
from among the stockholders, subject to Senate confirmation.1 31 The re-
maining twenty directors-a comfortable majority-were elected by the
other shareholders.' Although the President alone could remove any of
the five directors he appointed, he had no power over the other direc-
tors.' While there were bitter divisions about the wisdom of having na-
tional banks, the courts resolved the issue of their constitutionality in favor
of the banks' legitimacy.' 4
The Bank precedents suggest that Congress could assign the national
functions performed by the Federal Reserve Board to a private, or semi-
private, federal corporation over whose officers the President might have
even less control than he would over a non-presidential executive agency.
Any federal function that Congress can put in private hands can afortiori
be entrusted to an officer of the United States, either directly or through
the fiction of service ex officio, regardless of the degree of control permit-
ted the President.' 5
131. Act of Apr. 10, 1816, 3 Stat. 266 § 8.
132. The procedure for weighing votes was complex, and progressive among those wealthy
enough to afford the $100 per share offering price. Id. § 11 para. 1.
133. Id.
134. Congress' authority to incorporate a bank stems from the necessary and proper clause, U.S.
CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824)
(upholding constitutionality of Second Bank of the U.S.); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819) (same). Congress also based its authority on the coinage clause, U.S. CONST. art
I, § 8, cl. 5. See Report from the House Ways and Means Committee on the President's Message,
Register of Debates, 1830, App., 104 (Apr. 13, 1830), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
BANKING AND CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES 660, 665 (H. Krooss, ed. 1969). On the Second
Bank of the United States, see generally H. CATrERALL, THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED
STATES (1902); B. HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA (1957).
135. Indeed, it could be argued that most functions currently performed by the federal government
could be radically "privatized" in this manner. See Note, Federal Chartering of Corporations: Con-
stitutional Challenges, 61 GEo. L.J. 123, 128-32 (1972) (discussing federal chartering of various
types of corporations to execute various powers); cf. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, CONSTI-
TUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE FOR THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT COR-
PORATIONS 71-85, 390-433 (1976) (arguing for federal chartering of large corporations). The major
exception applies to standardless grants of the police power to private persons. A.L.A. Schecter Poul-
try Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537-42 (1935). However, the existence of de novo review by
an administrative agency or a court may legitimate otherwise troubling delegation of regulatory and
licensing power to private groups. See Liebmann, Delegations to Private Parties in American Consti-
tutional Law, 50 IND. L.J. 650, 701-04 (1976) (citing cases and examples). There are a large num-
ber of wholly-owned and "mixed-ownership" government corporations. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 9101-9109
(1982) (setting rules for financing and auditing such corporations). At some point, a government
corporation becomes legally equivalent to a government agency. See Morgan v. TVA, 115 F.2d 990,
994 (6th Cir. 1940) (TVA is executive agency; President may therefore remove Chairman of Board),
cert. denied, 312 U.S. 701 (1941); see also Rocap v. Indiek, 539 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation is "agency" for Freedom of Information Act); cf Held v. National
R.R. Passenger Corp., 101 F.R.D. 420 (D.D.C. 1984) (AMTRAK is not government corporation for
Age Discrimination in Employment Act); K. DAVIS, supra note 2, § 3.12 ("The case law has not
crystallized any consistent principle").
The analysis of whether such delegations are constitutional turns in part on whether the statutes
reviewed in McCulloch v. Maryland and Osborn v. Bank of the United States, see supra note 134,
vested a national function in the corporation, or merely gave a convenient legal status to a series of
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III. APPLIED AUTONOMY
A. Determining What Congress May Commit to an Autonomous Agency
Congress acts on strong constitutional foundations when it unambigu-
ously"'8 seeks to insulate one of the many but not unlimited matters com-
mitted to the legislature by Article I from the President's political manip-
ulation. Congress is weakest when facing the President's enumerated
powers:13 7 The President is the Commander in Chief,138 and possesses a
complex of foreign affairs powers,13 9 the veto, 4 ' the pardon power, 4" as
well as other powers." " As one of the President's implied or "inherent"
powers, the removal power is more susceptible to congressional modifica-
tion than are enumerated powers,143 but this should not become a congres-
sional license to create executive agencies in order to encroach on presi-
dential powers.
1 44
Focusing on the political branches' enumerated powers provides a clear-
cut and principled way to begin to define precisely which powers Con-
credit transactions that were, in theory, within the private capacities of individuals already. McCul-
loch is vague on this issue, perhaps intentionally so, see Pious & Baker, McCulloch v. Maryland:
Right Principle, Wrong Case, 9 STAN. L. REv. 710, 721-23, 725 (1957) (issue was argued by coun-
sel for Maryland), but Osborn states unequivocally that the Second Bank was a public, not private
institution, and hence immune from state taxation. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 859-60.
136. "The right of removal ... would exist as inherent in the power of appointment unless taken
away in plain and unambiguous language." Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 318 (1903). The
only exception in Myers to the broad dicta about the President's nearly plenary powers concerns those
officials with "duties so peculiarly and specifically committed [by Congress] to the discretion of a
particular officer as to raise a question whether the President may overrule or revise the officer's
interpretation of his statutory duty in a particular instance." Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135
(1926); see also supra note 2 (cases on officers appointed by other officers).
137. Weakest, but not powerless; Congress may at times be able to assert a countervailing enu-
merated power. See infra note 138 (congressional power over military affairs).
138. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cI. 1. However, this power is balanced by Congress' authority "To
declare War," id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11, "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces," id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14, and "To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the
Laws .... ." id. art. I, § 8, ci. 15. Thus, Congress may structure the manner in which the President
exercises authority over the armed forces.
139. The President's enumerated foreign affairs powers are the treaty-making power, U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; the power to nominate ambassadors, id. art. II, § 2, d. 2; and the power to
receive foreign emissaries, id. art. II, § 3.
140. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 7, ci. 2.
141. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.; see also infra note 160 (implication of pardon power).
142. U.S. CONsT. art. II, §§ 2, 3 & amend. XXV, § 2.
143. See Van Alstyne, supra note 37, at 107; see also supra text accompanying notes 58-88.
144. The perspective adopted in this Note can be applied to the non-delegation debate: All legisla-
tion must fall under a category authorized by Article I; if so, it can create an executive power. All
administration is inherently executive and thus must, in all but constitutionally-specified cases, be by a
person in that branch. At an extreme point, if Congress fails to set standards for administration, an
unconstitutional attempt to give the executive the legislative power will occur. Compare INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983) with Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst.,
448 U.S. 607, 685-86 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment) (Congress must make "impor-
tant choices of social policy") and A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,
537-42 (1935) (overturning standardless grant of discretion to President).
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gress can assign to non-presidential executive agents.14 Enumeration, for
example, allows one to determine that the Federal Reserve Board is con-
stitutional. 148 Ultimate control over the powers it exercises is constitution-
ally committed to the legislature. Because the Constitution goes to special
lengths to vest the control of money and finance solely in the Congress,'
147
and especially the House,148 matters involving the effective use of this
power are easily deemed executive rather than presidential.
1 49
Similar logic applies whenever Congress has good reason to believe that
an Article I function is threatened. Thus, it would have been constitu-
tional to create a substantially autonomous executive official to execute the
145. At the very least, considering enumerated powers-most of which are in Article I not Article
II-will redress the pro-presidential imbalance fostered by undue emphasis on implications from the
relatively vague phrases in Article II.
146. The Federal Reserve Board is the most important of the agencies for which Congress has
permitted for-cause removal without specifying what might constitute sufficient cause. See supra note
1.
The legal status of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board is murky. As a Member of the
Board the Chairman holds a 14-year term and can be dismissed for (unspecified) cause. Appointment
as Chairman, for which Membership is a prerequisite, requires separate confirmation by the Senate
and runs for only four years, with tenure staggered to fall in the middle of a President's term. There
is no specific removal procedure for the Chairman, and he is generally thought to be independent of
the President. Abolishing the Federal Reserve Board's autonomy would risk politicizing the nation's
money supply. See M. FRIEDMAN, A PROGRAM FOR MONETARY STABILITY, 85-99 (1959) (relying
on discretion of authorities is "highly objectionable"); Simons, Rules Versus Authorities in Monetary
Policy, 44 J. POL. ECoN. 1 (1936) (authorities not reliable).
There may, however, be no one with standing to challenge any of the Chairman's actions. See, e.g.,
Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
The most recent related challenge, though, went to the merits, Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt.
Comm., 644 F. Supp. 510 (D.D.C. 1986) (Senator has standing), but still failed. Id. at 517-24 (sup-
plemental opinion) (rejecting challenge to constitutionality of monetary body with private citizens
holding large minority of Directorships).
147. "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made
by Law.. . ." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; see Hart v. United States, 118 U.S. 62 (1885) (presiden-
tial pardon power cannot override appropriations clause); Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272
(1851) (judicial writ cannot override appropriations clause). Congress has the sole power "To coin
Money, [and to] regulate the Value thereof .... ." U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 5; see Norman v.
Baltimore & O.R.R. (Gold Clause Case), 294 U.S. 240, 330 (1934) (broad construction of powers
granted to Congress by coinage clause). Further, Congress has the "Power To lay and collect Taxes,"
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 1, to borrow on the credit of the nation, U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cI. 2, and
to punish counterfeiting, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6.
148. U.S. CONsT. art I, § 7, cI. 1 (revenue bills must originate in House).
149. The substantial textual commitment of financial matters to Congress alone is borne out by
the statements and practice of the Framers and the first Congresses. The Secretary of the Treasury
was placed on a more independent statutory footing than were most other Cabinet-level officers. See
supra notes 104-110 and accompanying text. The Comptroller of the Treasury, a key financial offi-
cial, was almost universally agreed to be independent. Even Madison, who usually supported Execu-
tive removal power, stated during the Constitutional Convention and again in the first Congress that
he believed the Comptroller of the Treasury should not be removable by the Executive. 1 ANNALS OF
CONG. 408, 637-38 (J. Gales ed. 1834), reprinted in I ANNALS OF CONG. 393, 611-12 (J. Gales ed.
1849). The Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 3, 1 Stat. 66, gave the Comptroller General authority to
countersign warrants. Without this signature, no monies could be paid out by the United States Trea-
sury. Theoretically, the Comptroller General retains this executive authority today. See F. MOSHER,
THE GAO 1-32 (1979). But see Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986) (Comptroller is legislative
branch official and cannot exercise executive budget-cutting power).
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budgetary functions that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act150 assigned to
the Comptroller General. The Comptroller's deficit forecasts, which were
to trigger a presidential obligation to cut the budget,1 51 concerned the ap-
propriations power. The Act was unconstitutional because it attached ex-
ecutive power to an officer of the legislative branch,15 2 not because it de-
nied them to the President. The 1984 Competition in Contracting Act1 53
may also fall, but again, only because the Comptroller is legislative, not
because he is protected from presidential removal.'" Finally, most other
autonomous agencies without the power to bring civil enforcement ac-
tions1 55 are on as firm ground as the Federal Reserve Board because their
functions concern the regulation of commerce, a task committed to
Congress. 56
Enumeration identifies many powers as either executive or presidential,
but alone it cannot categorize them all. An appropriate supplemental cri-
terion is whether Congress can assign the task in question to private
organizations 157-if the President can be cut out of administration en-
tirely, he has no cause to complain if Congress assigns the task to an
autonomous agency.
158
An example of an otherwise difficult problem that can be solved this
way is whether the FTC may constitutionally bring civil enforcement ac-
150. Public Debt Limit-Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L.
No. 99-177, 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (99 Stat.) 1037.
151. Id. § 251.
'152. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3191.
153. Pub. L. No. 98-369, subtit. D, 98 Stat. 1199 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-56 (Supp. II
1984)). See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (description of Comptroller's role in CICA).
154. In Ameron v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 85-5226, slip. op. (3d Cir. Dec. 31,
1986), the Third Circuit found CICA to be constitutional because the comptroller's decisions on the
merits of bid protests were legislative judgments which the executive can ignore. Although the execu-
tive might have to obey when the Comptroller increased the 90-day stay period (in some cases the
head of a procuring agency can override a stay with an appropriate certification) the court found that
the interference with the executive would be de minimis. Id. at 39-43. Following Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3260 (1986), the court held that a de minimis separation
of powers violation need not be overturned, particularly when its result is to "effectuate[] . . . the
'proper balance' of power." Ameron, slip. op. at 40-41.
If indeed an usurpation of an executive power can be de minimis then perhaps CICA need not be
overturned. If, by contrast, the Supreme Court applies a bright-line separation of powers principle,
then even a small violation will suffice to invalidate CICA.
155. See supra note 1 (partial list of affected agencies); see also supra note 2 (reasons why list
can only be partial).
156. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For a partial list of agencies potentially affected, see supra
notes 1-2.
157. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
158. See Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 644 F. Supp. 510, 517-524 (D.D.C. 1986) (H.
Greene, J.) (using similar reasoning to uphold constitutionality of Federal Open Market Committee),
appeal docketed, No. 86-5692 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 16, 1986). For an example of such an argument, see
supra note 135 and accompanying text. There are, of course, counter-arguments that the greater
congressional power need not include the lesser in the separation of powers context. Any such argu-
ment, however, should carry a burden of proving that if adopted it would diffuse power among the
branches, or otherwise increase individual freedom.
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tions' 59 No enumerated power determines whether all enforcement ac-
tions must be by an officer answerable to the President."6" Congress' abil-
ity to create private attorneys general to pursue civil enforcement
actions"6 ' suggests, however, that civil enforcement power could in theory
be radically privatized, just as many traditionally governmental functions
could in theory be turned over to federal corporations." If so, then the
same a fortiori argument legitimates allowing non-presidential executive
agencies to initiate civil enforcement actions.16
B. The Limits of Autonomy
If the take care clause empowers the President, rather than creating a
duty, 6 this should be understood to mean that it gives him the power to
enforce the standard of governmental performance set by Congress, not to
159. See supra notes 3-5, 11 (agencies, including FTC, challenged).
160. The President could argue that the pardon power-which can be exercised before prosecu-
tion-implies exclusive presidential responsibility for criminal prosecutions, and perhaps civil prose-
cutions as well. Prosecutorial discretion, after all, is discretion not to prosecute, and thus analogous to
a pre-prosecution pardon. In support of this view the President might note that the Supreme Court
singled out the prosecutorial function, both civil and criminal, as uniquely deserving of absolute im-
munity against civil suits arising out of the performance of official duties by executive branch officials.
See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 515 (1978); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 811
n.16 (1982) ("quasi-prosecutorial" function). This immunity suggests that the prosecutorial function
is presidential, since only the President enjoys full civil immunity for the performance of official
duties. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982). But see id. at 748 n.27 (leaving open possibility
that Congress could create presidential liability by statute). Lower courts have at times suggested that
civil and criminal matters are indistinguishable for purposes of prosecutorial discretion. See Nader v.
Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679-80 & n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
On the other hand, Congress may give other executive officials the power to remit fines and penal-
ties by statute despite the assignment of the pardon power to the President. The Laura, 114 U.S. 411
(1885); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 282-83
(1856). And United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), suggests that the power to bring (not
remit) even criminal prosecutions may be executive rather than presidential. The United States v.
Nixon Court stated that the executive has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide
whether to prosecute a case, but it held that the President cannot unilaterally countermand a decision
on what materials will be subpoenaed by a special prosecutor working pursuant to regulations with-
out first publicly rescinding the regulations according to established procedures. See Van Alstyne, A
Political and Constitutional Review of United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L. REV. 116 (1974). Al-
lowing autonomous agencies to bring civil enforcement actions in no way restricts the presidential
pardon power. Furthermore, there is considerable precedent supporting civil enforcement by non-
presidential executive agencies. See, e.g., SEC v. Robert Collier & Co., Inc., 76 F.2d 939 (2d Cir.
1935) (L.Hand, J.); accord SEC v. Sloan, 535 F.2d 679, 681 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 996 (1977).
Admittedly, tradition suggests particularly strongly that the criminal prosecution power should be
electorally accountable. Perhaps fortunately therefore the FTC's enforcement power is purely civil;
criminal prosecutions remain solely in the hands of persons directly accountable to the President.
161. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
162. See supra note 135.
163. See supra text accompanying note 135. In any event, the President's pardon power will
always remain the ultimate check were an agency to run rampant. There are fewer administrative
obstacles to pardons than there are to impeachments.
164. See supra note 5 (authors holding this view).
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create the standards themselves.1 6 At most, therefore, the take care clause
permits the President to suspend or remove department heads for good
cause, as defined by Congress, such as engaging in criminal behavior, or
exceeding their statutory authority.1"6
Congress often states causes for removal, thereby setting standards of
faithful execution for the President to enforce. Most independent agency
heads may be removed for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office" and presumably no other cause. 167 The heads of certain other inde-
pendent agencies are protected by very restrictive statutes. 68 Board mem-
bers of the National Labor Relations Board are entitled to "notice and
hearing" if the President should seek to remove them for either neglect or
malfeasance.16 9 The Labor-Management Relations Act demonstrates that
Congress can offer a Head of Department substantial autonomy without
infringing upon the President's legitimate supervisory role. This substan-
tial protection should satisfy the congressional concerns behind the crea-
165. It might seem that the President should be free to set the standard in the face of congres-
sional silence. However, Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958) (unanimous decision), suggests
that even in the face of such silence the President may still have to allege reasonable cause if there is a
clear Congressional intent that the agency be autonomous. Wiener held that, in the absence of statu-
tory authorization, the President could not remove a "quasi-judicial" officer without good cause. 357
U.S. at 356. Plaintiff was a member of the War Claims Commission, an executive body the Court
found was clearly intended by Congress to be shielded from presidential control. Id. (The Commission
cannot have been in either the legislative or judicial branches and must, by elimination, have been in
the executive. Had the Commission been in the judicial branch the Court would simply have disposed
of the case on Article III grounds of life tenure. Instead the Commission's power appears to have been
seen as arising from Article I. See id. at 355.) Logically, the holding in Wiener should apply to any
executive function other than those specifically reserved to the President.
Although Wiener is often taken to mean that Congress may protect those officers whose function is
not "purely executive," see, e.g., J. MAsHAW & R. MERRILL, supra note 70, at 118-19, read nar-
rowly it holds only that Congress may require cause for dismissal of a "quasi-judicial" official (an
"executive" official under the terminology proposed in this Note), not that the official may be fully
insulated from removal. See Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for Honorable David Stockman
(Feb. 12, 1981), Pt. II, reprinted in J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, supra note 70, at 153-54. The
definition of a "purely executive official" ("presidential" under the terms proposed in this Note)
remains unsettled.
166. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 3. The take care clause might also require that the President be
allowed to fire officials for negligence. In any case, Congress has usually included inefficiency as one
of the causes for presidential removal. See supra note 1 (statutes on removal of independent agency
officers for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office").
If the Constitution permits Congress to restrict presidential removals to a "for cause" standard, does
it also define what that standard is? In other words, does the necessary and proper clause allow
Congress to define cause for removal, or does the take care clause require that the President be al-
lowed to suspend or fire for particular offenses? One place to look for minimum standards might be
the part of the Constitution that contains standards for removal-the impeachment clause's require-
ment of "high crimes and misdemeanors," the original understanding of which covered a relatively
narrow range of subjects. See R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 53-102
(1973). Because these standards properly apply to removals by Congress, the best place to look for
standards to apply to presidential removals is acts of Congress, which after all make up the very laws
whose faithful execution the President is charged to oversee.
167. See supra notes 1-2.
168. See supra note 1.
169. Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982).
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tion of so-called independent agencies.1 70 A notice and hearing require-
ment allows Congress time to respond both formally and informally to a
threatened dismissal, rather than to a presidential fait accompli. A notice
and hearing requirement also creates due process rights which should al-
low judicial review of dismissals, for both the fairness of the hearing and
perhaps the validity of the underlying allegation.1 7 1 Without a hearing, a
court might be reluctant to rule that a dismissal was improper, if only for
lack of judicially cognizable standards.172
IV. CONCLUSION
Distinguishing between executive and presidential agencies reconciles
the otherwise competing objectives of allowing Congress to structure the
executive, shielding core presidential functions from legislative encroach-
ment, and accommodating the Court's desire for a bright-line separation
of powers. The distinction in Humphrey's Executor between "purely ex-
ecutive" functions and others, which can be assigned "independent" sta-
tus, should be abandoned in favor of a taxonomy based on constitutionally
committed powers, which preserves the holdings of existing cases and pro-
vides a coherent guide for the future.
170. See supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text. Political realities being what they are, few
Presidents will seek to remove an officer who is entitled to a public hearing unless there is good cause.
171. A notice and hearing requirement would also allow Congress to set the standard of review
that courts should apply.
172. Congress has failed to specify removal procedures and thus to set a standard of faithful
execution for the heads of several agencies. See supra note 1. But see supra note 165 (Supreme Court
requires that there be some cause for firing of "quasi-judicial" officer).
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